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“amateurs study strategy; professionals study 
logistics” is a maxim often attributed to the 
late general omar Bradley. getting supplies 
to soldiers has been proven to be a challenge 
throughout history.  
during the nineteenth century, the vast 
spaces of the american West presented 
endless problems for those army officers 
whose duties included feeding, housing, 
and clothing soldiers.  
By the end of the 1840s, after five 
years of territorial expansion, the army 
faced a logistical crisis.  in 1844 sixty-
nine of its companies were manning 
twenty western forts, none of them 
farther west than Fort Leavenworth.  in 
1849 eighty-six companies were scattered 
among forty posts.  half of the western 
posts were supplied by steamboat; the 
rest stood an average of forty-six miles 
from a navigable river – five or six days’ 
journey by ox-team.  in 1845 the army 
paid $130,000 for transportation.  in 
1850 the army paid $2,094,000 for  an 
increase of 1,500 percent.  Military 
authorities racked their brains for ways 
to cut costs.
Fort riley was founded in 1853 
at the confluence of the smoky hill 
and republican rivers, about halfway 
between the roads to santa Fe and the 
pacific Coast.  the closest the army 
came to conducting a feasibility study 
of supplying the new post by water 
was to send a lieutenant down the 
Kaw river in a canoe that summer –
the third in a string of wet years on 
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the plains.  he pronounced the river 
navigable for at least “two to four 
months of the year, dating from the 
first spring rise.”  the next year, 
another officer boasted, “navigation of 
the Kansas [river] has opened a way... 
for all the supplies that will ever be 
required at Fort riley.”  still, only three 
steamboats managed to make it as far as 
the fort between 1854 and 1866.  Most 
government freight continued to move 
by ox-team.
steam provided the motive power for 
another means of transportation:  the 
railroad.  Between 1854 and the end of 
1860, the territorial legislature of Kansas 
chartered at least fifty railroads.  By 
october 1866, the railroad had reached 
Junction City.  it did not rest there for 
long.  in the spring of 1867, track-laying 
continued west, and army quartermasters 
prepared to move their supply depot for 
the central plains from Fort riley to Fort 
harker, near ellsworth – five or six days’ 
journey by ox-team, but only five hours 
by rail.  the depot at Fort riley had 
employed more than 320 teamsters during 
the previous summer.  the Junction City 
Union observed that “the onward progress 
of the railroad... will render useless to 
[the] government the keeping up of such 
a military establishment as Fort riley.          
it must before long be abandoned.”   
Local business interests wanted the 
20,000-acre military reservation opened 
to settlement.
Civilians were just as aware of freight 
costs as army officers.  although a 
jubilant reception always greeted the 
first locomotive to arrive in town, 
residents along the line of the Kansas 
pacific soon came to realize that the 
railroad could set whatever rates it 
pleased.  Local businessmen were 
alive to the advantages of competition 
between the rival commercial centers 
of Chicago and st. Louis as well as 
between railroads.  By 1869 the Union’s 
editor fumed, “it is impossible that 
so large a population, and interests of 
such magnitude, should... submit to 
such exactions as are imposed upon the 
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district of country now tributary to the 
Kansas pacific railway.”
during the late 1860s Kansas 
entrepreneurs began to incorporate short-
line railroads that would connect with 
the larger markets of Chicago, st. Louis, 
and even galveston and new orleans.  
the activities of railroad promoters 
in Junction City and Manhattan were 
important because they helped build the 
short-lines that connected their cities 
and Fort riley to the Missouri, Kansas 
& texas and the atchison, topeka & 
santa Fe railroads at emporia and to 
the Union pacific at Kearney, nebraska.  
Connections to major transcontinental 
lines put Fort riley in the center of the 
nation’s rail network just as decisively as 
national expansion to the rio grande 
and the pacific ocean during the 1840s 
had put the great plains in the center 
of the United states.  Low freight costs 
eventually made Fort riley the cheapest 
post in the country to supply and led 
to the establishment of the Mounted 
Branch school there, which extended the 
fort’s economic importance for decades 
into the twentieth century.  this was 
not at all what local railroad promoters 
had anticipated, as many of them had 
favored reducing the size of the military 
reservation and opening the land to 
settlement.  their immediate interest, 
though, lay in access to competing 
railroads and a variety of markets.
railroads linked local and national 
interests.  they promoted commerce 
and military efficiency at the same time, 
and while the army used the railroads, 
the railroads changed the army.  “For a 
hundred years we have been sweeping 
across the continent,” general William 
t. sherman wrote in 1882.  “now we are 
across, and have railroads everywhere.”  
the next year, in his last annual report 
before retirement, sherman concluded, 
“i now regard the indians as substantially 
eliminated from the problem of the 
army,” and credited the rail network as 
an even more important cause of the 
development than the advance of white 
settlement or the activities of the army 
itself.  Yet the railroads, sherman went 
on, “constantly call for the protection 
of the military” and the army needed to 
revise its entire scheme of garrisons and 
depots, concentrating large bodies of 
troops where they could be moved rapidly 
and supplied cheaply.  general philip 
h. sheridan, headquartered in Chicago, 
described his own command, “the 
extension of railroads in all directions 
over the vast region between the Missouri 
river and the rocky Mountains now 
affords an opportunity for concentration...
and economical results are anticipated.”  
as always, the general had his eye on 
transportation costs.
sherman, the army’s commanding 
general since 1869, pondered its future 
needs as he neared the end of his career.  
in his annual report of 1882, he drew 
up a list of posts to be abandoned as 
soon as possible - posts to be active only 
a few years longer and posts suitable for 
large bodies of troops to be regarded 
as permanent.  he listed Fort riley, 
with its locally quarried, native stone 
buildings “meant to last forever,” in the 
last category.
sheridan succeeded sherman as 
commanding general in 1884.  in his 
first annual report, sheridan mentioned 
Fort riley “on the line of the Kansas 
pacific railway,” its “beautiful, large 
reservation,” and the need for a cavalry 
school there.  after visiting the fort in 
May 1885, he wrote to the secretary 
of War, praising Fort riley’s location 
in “the richest agricultural section of 
the state of Kansas.”  he went on to 
recommend the establishment of “a 
good cavalry school... and a place where 
we could take such horses as are worn 
out by hard service... and recuperate 
them.”  sheridan emphasized the 
...he wrote to the secretary 
of War, praising Fort 
riley’s location in “the 
richest agricultural section 
of the state of Kansas.” 
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fort’s hay acreage, which “could not 
be exhausted.”  the report ended with 
an appraisal of Fort riley’s existing 
structures and suggestions for future 
construction.  soon after writing the 
secretary of War, sheridan ordered 
general schofield, his successor in 
command of the Military division 
of the Missouri, to draw up plans 
for barracks to house four cavalry 
companies and quarters for their 
officers, to be built during the next 
fiscal year.  “the money,” sheridan 
promised, “will be ready June thirtieth.”
Without question, Fort riley needed 
more money if the War department 
intended to keep it open.  Leaving 
aside a tornado that struck the post in 
1882, as well as normal maintenance, 
Fort riley’s retention as a cavalry post 
demanded new buildings.  Construction 
of barracks, officers’ quarters, and 
stables got under way while sheridan’s 
and schofield’s projected school for 
cavalry and field artillery was still in 
the planning stage.  Most of the federal 
government’s expenditures on these 
projects during the next five years 
wound up in the pockets of davis 
(geary) County contractors, workers, 
and merchants.
since those dollars came from 
Congressional appropriations, and 
since tax bills must originate in the 
house of representatives, sheridan set 
out to cultivate the chairman of the 
house Military affairs Committee.  
he did this in a long letter, filled with 
statistics that compared the cost of 
supplies at Fort riley with costs at four 
other military posts.  Fort riley won, 
hands down.  “When the post is in the 
vicinity of a [rail] line or line of railway 
By the time the Mounted 
Branch school opened in 
1892, Congress had sunk 
more than $740,000 into 
Fort riley – about $18.5 
million in today’s dollars.
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communication or in a country where 
beef, one of the principal articles of the 
ration, is cheap, the cost is reduced to 
a minimum,” the general wrote.  Before 
the year was out, the chairman notified 
sheridan of the appropriation’s passage.  
sheridan expressed himself  “greatly 
gratified” and “much obliged.”
By the time the Mounted Branch 
school opened in 1892, Congress had 
sunk more than $740,000 into Fort 
riley – about $18.5 million in today’s 
dollars.  setting aside some special 
projects such as a steam-heating plant 
and the waterworks, which went to out-
of-state firms, nearly sixty-three percent 
of expenditures in a five-year period went 
to davis County contractors, with other 
Kansas firms getting a further nineteen 
percent.  the businessmen, editors, 
and politicians of nearby counties 
and Kansas statewide had cooperated 
to an unprecedented degree with one 
another and with the army officers 
who needed their help, and they had 
reaped enormous profits.  Fort riley’s 
renovation and expansion sustained a 
maturing economy in Kansas, and in the 
West as a region.  skillful lobbying was 
partly responsible for the appropriations, 
but the original impetus, modernizing the 
army, was beyond local control.  tension 
between local and national interests, 
as well as the scale of the operation – 
the size of the garrison, of the physical 
plant, and of the disbursements – would 
characterize Fort riley’s history, and that 
of the american West, for more than a 
hundred years to come.
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